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PARTIES TO THE APPEAL 
Appellant Citicorp Mortgage, Inc. [hereafter "Citicorp"], was Plaintiff, and Appellee 
Wayne E. Hardy [hereafter "Hardy"] was Defendant in an action brought to recover an 
alleged deficiency owed Citicorp by Hardy following a Trustee's Sale of property securing 
Hardy's note to Citicorp. 
JURISDICTIONAL STATEMENT 
This Court has jurisdiction to hear this Appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §78-2-
2(3)0") (1987 Rep. Vol. 9, 1953, as amended). 
NATURE OF THE APPEAL 
Citicorp appeals from a decision of the Third Judicial District Court of Salt Lake 
County, Civil No. 890904015PR, Judge Kenneth Rigtrup presiding, denying its motion for 
entry of judgment and dismissing its Complaint against Hardy. 
STATEMENT OF ISSUES 
1. No Responsive Pleading Issue Dismissed. The first issue raised by Citicorp1, by 
stipulation of the parties and order of this Court, has been dismissed. 
20 Dismissal of Complaint. Did the District Court properly dismiss Citicorp's 
Complaint as untimely filed pursuant to Utah Code Ann. §57-1-32 (1990 Rep.Vol. 6A, 1953, 
as amended), when that action was commenced more than three months following the 
Trustee's Sale and more than 30 days following dismissal of Hardy's bankruptcy petition? 
3. Attorney's Fees. Is Hardy entitled to be awarded his attorney's fees and costs 
incurred in defending this action, including this Appeal 
DETERMINATIVE PROVISIONS OF LAW 
11 U.S.C.A. §108(c) (West 1979): 
(c) Except as provided in section 524 of this title, if applicable nonbankruptcy 
law, an order entered in a nonbankruptcy proceeding, or an agreement fixes 
a period for commencing or continuing a civil action in a court other than a 
1
 The propriety of the District Court's dismissal of the action when no responsive 
pleading had been filed 
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bankruptcy court on a claim against the debtor, or against an individual with 
respect to which such individual is protected under section 1201 or 1301 of 
this title, and such period has not expired before the date of the filing of the 
petition, then such period does not expire until the later of--
(1) the end of such period, including any suspension of such period 
occurring on or after the commencement of the case; or 
(2) 30 days after notice of termination or expiration of the stay under 
section 362, 922, 1201 or 1301 of this title, as the case may be, with respect 
to such claim. 
UCA §57-1-32: 
57-1-32. Sale of trust property by trustee - Action to recover balance due 
upon obligation for which trust deed was given as security. 
At any time within three months after any sale of property under a 
trust deed, as hereinabove provided, an action may be commenced to recover 
the balance due upon the obligation for which the trust deed was given as 
security, and in such action the complaint shall set forth the entire amount of 
the indebtedness which was secured by such trust deed, the amount for which 
such property was sold, and the fair market value thereof at the date of sale. 
Before rendering judgment, the court shall find the fair market value at the 
date of sale of the property sold. The court many not render judgment for 
more than the amount by which the amount of the indebtedness with interest, 
costs and expenses of sale, including trustee's and attorney's fees, exceed the 
fair market value of the property as of the date of the sale. In any action 
brought under this section, the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect its 
costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action under this 
section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
Citicorp filed its Complaint against Hardy on June 27, 1989, some 43 days after the 
Bankruptcy Court of Utah denied Hardy's Discharge under his Chapter 7 bankruptcy filing, 
and some 272 days after a Trustee's Sale of the property securing Hardy's indebtedness to 
Citicorp. Hardy was finally served with process on April 16, 1990. Through a 
misunderstanding between counsel, no Answer or other responsive pleading was filed, and 
Citicorp filed a Notice of Default and sought default judgment. On December 18, 1990, 
Judge Rigtrup in a Memorandum Decision, denied Citicorp's Motion for Entry of Default 
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Judgment and, based upon UCA §57-1-32, dismissed its Complaint against Hardy. Citicorp 
timely filed the instant Appeal. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
As evidenced by Attachment A to Appellant's Brief2, on September 26, 1985, Hardy 
borrowed $89,300 from Richards-Woodbury Mortgage Corporation [hereafter "Richards-
Woodbury"] and secured his Promissory Note with a Trust Deed on property located in Salt 
Lake County, Utah. Thereafter, that Note and Trust Deed were assigned to Citicorp. On 
August 5,1987, Hardy filed a petition in bankruptcy under Chapter 7. Citicorp sought relief 
from the automatic stay, 11 U.S.C.A. §362 (West 1979), which relief was granted on May 
4, 1988. Citicorp, Ex. B. Citicorp thereafter filed Notice of Default on May 27, 1988, and 
a Trustee's Sale was held on September 28, 1988, wherein Citicorp purchased the property 
for $41,300 and received a Trustee's Deed. Citicorp, Ex. C. Thereafter, on or about 
November 3, 1988, Citicorp obtained an appraisal of the property which reflected a value 
of $74,900. Citicorp, Ex. D. Citicorp did not furnish a copy of that appraisal to Hardy nor 
to the Trustee in Bankruptcy nor did it advise Hardy and/or the Trustee in Bankruptcy of 
its intention to seek a deficiency judgment. On April 21, 1989, the Bankruptcy Court, for 
reasons not related to the Citicorp obligation, granted a creditor's motion to deny Hardy 
a discharge. Citicorp, Ex. E. Formal Notice of Denial of Discharge was given by the Clerk 
of the Bankruptcy Court on May 15, 1989. Citicorp, Ex. D. On June 27, 1989, 43 days after 
the Notice of Denial of Discharge and 272 days after sale of the property, Citicorp first 
announced its intention to seek a deficiency judgment by filing its Complaint in this matter 
in the District Court, and the first time Hardy became aware of that action was on April 16, 
19903. As discussed above, page 1, that Complaint was ultimately dismissed and this 
2Hereafter, references to pages or exhibits in Appellant's Brief will be "Citicorp, p. _, 
or Citicorp, Ex._." 
3Citicorp alleges service was accomplished on April 12,1990. Reference to Citicorp, Ex. 
G, reveals that the date of service was April 16, 1990. 
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Appeal ensued. Based upon the District Court's disposition of this matter, issues relating to 
service of process, propriety of the procedure in the conduct of the sale of the property, and 
the substantive issues of whether or not Citicorp was entitled to a deficiency judgment, are 
not before this Court in this Appeal 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Point I 
U.S.C.A. §362 stayed any action by Citicorp to collect from Hardy. The relief from 
the stay allowed sale of the property but any action to recover a deficiency continued to be 
stayed, although the time for filing such action continued to run. When Hardy was denied 
discharge on May 15, 1989, under U.S.C.A. § 108(c), Citicorp had 30 days, or until June 14, 
1989, within which period to commence its action for a deficiency. Since its Complaint was 
filed June 27,1989, it was outside the 30-day period and, hence, its Complaint was untimely 
filed and dismissal was proper. 
Point II 
Although the automatic stay prohibited Citicorp from instituting an action seeking 
a deficiency judgment against Hardy, it was not prohibited from filing a Proof of Claim with 
the Trustee for the claimed deficiency within three months after sale of the property. Had 
it done so, Hardy, directly or through his counsel, would have been made aware of the claim 
and, under recent interpretations of UCA §57-1-32, Citicorp would have, arguably, complied 
with the three-month time period. 
Point III 
Contrary to Citicorp's assertion, public policy demands that debtors not be subject 
to unknown claims for deficiencies pursuant to UCA §57-1-32. Hardy had no knowledge 
that Citicorp would seek a deficiency and could not act to obtain or perpetuate evidence to 
counter such claims for a deficiency. Citicorp's failure to avail itself of the opportunity to 
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make its Proof of Claim known through the Bankruptcy Court should now bar its recovery. 
Point IV 
Under UCA §5 7-1-32 and under rules of practice in this Court, I laid) is entitled to 
be awarded his attorneys fees and costs incurred herein. 
ARGUMENT 
Point I: V.S.CA. §108(c)CONTROLS THE RUNNING OF TIME PERIODS WHEN 
BANKRUPTCY IS INVOLVED AND PROVIDED CITICORP ONLY UNTIL 
JUNE 14, 1989, TO FILE ITS COMPLAINT AGAINST HARDY FOR A 
DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT 
A secured debt against a debtor's real property really consists of two components: 
the seem eel or Ii i r en i portion which, i indei 1 1 I J S.C A §506 (West 1979), is the va iiie of 
the property in the estate of the debtor, and the in personam claim against the debtor for 
the portion beyond the value of the property. See, Johnson v. Home State Bank, 111 S.Ct. 
2150 (1991); Eastland Mortgage Co. v. Hart, et at ( In i e: i iart ), 923 R2d 1410 (1 Oil :i Cir. 
1991), 21 BCD 385. The source of both the in rem and the in personam claims against the 
debtor is the underlying obligation of the debtoi to the creditor, in this ease, the Hardy's 
Promissory Note to Richards-Woodbury. Johnson v. Home State Bank, supra, at 2153. 
Since Citicorp's claim against Hardy was based on the September 26,1985, Note, which note 
clearly predates the filing of his petition undei Chapter 7, pursuant to I J S.C. < \ §362, 
collection action by Citicorp was stayed. When Citicorp obtained its relief from the stay and 
sold the property at a Trustee's Sale, under the reasoning of In re: Hart and Johnson v. 
Home State Bank, supra, the in rem action was terminated but the in personam claim against 
Hardy remained. Since the in personam claim was a pre-petition claim, enforcement of that 
claim, continued to be stayed b> I J S.C A, §362 Hie Bankruptcy Court's order denying 
Hardy discharge, however, operated to eliminate that stay. U.S.C.A. §362(c) provides: 
(c) Except as provided in subsections (d). (e), arid (f) of this section [noil 
relevant to this matter]-
(2) the stay of any other act under subsection (a) of this section 
continues until the earliest of -
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(A) the time the case is closed; 
(B) the time the case is dismissed; and 
(C) if the case is a case under chapter 7 of this title concerning an 
individual or a case under chapter 9, 11, or 13 of this title, the time a discharge 
is granted or denied. [Emphasis added] 
Although Hardy disagrees that Citicorp was barred from taking any action with regard to 
its claim for a deficiency, he does agree that the stay under U.S.C.A. §362 prevented 
Citicorp from actually filing suit against him within three months after the Trustee Sale. 
UCA §57-1-32 was an "applicable law" as used in U.S.C.A. § 108(c), and that section governs 
how long Citicorp had to bring its deficiency action.4 The only remaining question is 
whether following the Denial of Discharge, Citicorp had three months, as provided in UCA 
§57-1-32, or 30 days, as provided in U.S.C.A. §108(c), to commence its action against Hardy. 
This issue has been characterized by one court as being whether the limitations period was 
"suspended" [which, in this case, would afford Citicorp the three-month period] or continued 
to run but was "extended" [which, in this case, would limit Citicorp to the 30 day period]. 
Ross Wilkey, Trustee v. Union Bank & Trust Company, et al, (In re Baird), 63 Bankr. 60 
(Bkrtcy. W.D. Ky. 1986). There the Court reviewed the Congressional history of U.S.C.A. 
§ 108(c) and concluded, at 63: 
We hold that Section 108(c) of the Bankruptcy Code extends a creditor's right 
to bring an action through the pendency of a debtor's bankruptcy case only 
for 30 days after the automatic stay expires by operation of law or is lifted by 
order of court. Section 108 does not in and of itself suspend the running of 
a statute of limitation. The reference in Section 108(c) to "suspension" is not 
to the operation of bankruptcy law but to other, specialized "suspension" 
statutes, such as the Internal Revenue Code section cited in the legislative 
history. [Emphasis is the Court's] 
Other courts have concurred: First American Title Co. v. Design Builders, Inc., (In re: Design 
Builders, Inc., 18 Bankr. 392 (D. Idaho 1981); See, also, John Morton v. National Bank of 
New York City (In re: Morton), 866 F.2d 561 (2nd Cir. 1989), 19 BCD 85, where the court 
4In this regard, Utah Code Ann. §78-12-41 (1987 Rep.Vol. 9, 1953, as amended) seems 
to be irrelevant since the protection it provides is built into U.S.C.A. § 108(c). 
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concluded that U.S.CA. § 108(c) "tolled" the filing of an action but did not suspend the 
obligation on the creditor to take such actions as required by state law to "extend, continue 
or renew" its statutory lien. 
While periods of limitations are clearly designed to prevent stale claims by limiting 
the period of time within which one can discover, perfect and bring si ill: on a claim, si ich a 
period of limitations should not be applied to bar a claim when the holder of that claim was 
statutorily prevented from filing the action within the period allowed. UCA §78-12-41 and 
U.S.CA. §108(c) are statutes enacted to prevent just such an inequity. Howevei , those 
statutes should be applied to harmonize, as far as possible, with the limitations statute. Millet 
v. Clark Clinic Corporation, filN \\2i\ ^M (l Mali I'Ml) Since a bankruptcy filing does not 
prevent discovery of the claim nor does it prevent the creditor from evaluating or otherwise 
perfecting its claim, interpreting U.S.CA. §108(c) as "extending the limitations period" as 
opposed to "suspending the running of the lixn itations period" provides such harmony by 
providing the creditor the necessary protection that its claim will not be time barred as a 
result of the bankruptcy stay; yet not defeating the purpose of the period of limitations.5 
Applying such an interpretation to U.S.CA. §108(c)(l) in the context of this case, would be 
illustrated by the following example: If the bankruptcy order denying Hardy a discharge 
would have been .-,'*:<-- Ocir^vi ^ ;ws,\ . ,ionn> <ii:ci iiu- r .stcv* 'vile), 
Citicorp would have had two months to bring its action since the period remaining under 
UCA §57-1-32 exceeded the 30 days provided r v t s C A. §108(c). Such a reading is 
consistent with purposes of I JCA §57-1-32 and \ S ".v 1/ 4 i and apj-t. :.-<* cm ^>tent 
with this Court's reasoning in Millet v. Clark, supra. 
5The harm in ruling otherwise is apparent when one considers that such a ruling would 
apply with equal force to periods of limitation for contracts (6 years), judgments (8 years), 
other actions (4 years). Considering that bankruptcy cases can be pending for many years, 
the purpose of the periods of limitation could be entirely defeated. 
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Point II: CITICORP WAS NOT PREVENTED FROM PROVIDING NOTICE OF ITS 
INTENTION TO SEEK A DEFICIENCY WITHIN THREE MONTHS 
FOLLOWING THE TRUSTEES SALE 
Under 11 U.S.C.A. §501 (West 1979), there is no restriction on when a 
creditor may file a Proof of Claim. Interpreting U.S.C.A. §501, the courts have held that 
while a secured creditor does not have to file a Proof of Claim with regard to the secured 
portion of its debt, the creditor must file a Proof of Claim for the unsecured portion if it 
wishes to recoup that portion and there may be other procedural reasons why a creditor 
would wish to file a proof of claim although not mandated to do so. See, 3 Collier on 
Bankruptcy 11501.01 (15th Ed. 1990), and the cases cited therein. Thus, although Hardy's 
Chapter 7 filing had been deemed a "no asset" case and the filing of Proof of Claim was not 
required, clearly nothing under the Bankruptcy Act prevented Citicorp from filing a Proof 
of Claim for a deficiency with the Trustee. Had Citicorp done so, Hardy would have, at a 
minimum, had constructive notice of the intention to seek a deficiency. Had Citicorp 
followed custom and sent a copy of the proof of claim to Hardy's counsel, Hardy would 
likely have had actual notice of the claim for deficiency and, hence, an opportunity to obtain 
and preserve evidence to defend against such deficiency claim. In interpreting UCA §57-1-
32, this court has placed greater emphasis on the actual notice of the creditor's intention 
and less emphasis on "procedural hurdles to suit, hurdles that can be cleared, rather than 
absolute bars to suit" [Standard Federal Saving and Loan Association v. Kirkbride, 161 Utah 
Adv.Rep. 26 (May 17, 1991)]. Without conceding that filing such a Proof of Claim would 
have justified not filing within 30 days following denial of discharge, it would have been 
more analogous to the situation in that case. In this case, Hardy had no actual knowledge 
of Citicorp's intention until he received service of process on April 16, 1990. Citicorp's 
anticipated argument that U.S.C.A. §362 prevented or excused it from taking any action to 
provide Hardy notice of its intention to claim a deficiency is not supported by the 
Bankruptcy Act nor the cases. In re: Morton, supra. Citicorp was not prevented from taking 
action {e.g., filing a Proof of Claim in the amount of the alleged deficiency) within the time 
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requirements of UCA §57-1-32. Denial of discharge is not uncommon and Citicorp could 
reasonably have foreseen its occurrence in Hardyfs case. However, it chose to assume that 
Hardy would be discharged and hence its alleged deficiency not recoverable. Citicorp, not 
Hardy, should be charged with consequences of that choice and, without regard to § 108(c), 
Citicorp's failure file Proof of Claim bars its claim for a deficiency and Judge Rigtrup's 
dismissal of its Complaint was proper. 
Point III: PUBLIC POLICY REQUIRES THAT THE DISTRICT COURTS 
DISMISSAL BE UPHELD 
The public policy issue raised in Point III of Citicorp's brief is clearly specious. 
Hardy filed his Chapter 7 petition nine months before Citicorp sought relief from the stay 
and over a year before the Trustee's Sale occurred. Any suggestion that the filing was done 
to limit Citicorp's rights under UCA §57-1-32 is simply without merit. Of even more 
importance, U.S.C.A. § 108(c) was enacted to, and does prevent exactly the harm suggested 
by Citicorp. See, 2 Collier on Bankruptcy, 11108.04 (15th Ed. 1991). In fact, in light of the 
clear applicability of U.S.C.A. § 108(c), it is inexplicable that Citicorp does not discuss that 
statute in its brief. Also, it is significant that while Citicorp complains that the trial court 
did not consider UCA §78-12-41, it fails to mention or include as part of its brief, the 
Court's minute entry of December 18, 1989 [Attached hereto as Exhibit A to Appellee's 
Brief], wherein the Court raises, inter alia, the issue of failure to comply with UCA §57-1-32. 
Citicorp also fails to include in its brief, its "Plaintiffs Response to Courts Minute Entry of 
12-18-89" [attached hereto as Exhibit B to Appellee's Brief]. In that document, Citicorp fails 
to discuss or even cite UCA §78-12-41, let alone the controlling statute, U.S.C.A. §108(c). 
The mess Citicorp finds itself in is not due to Judge Rigtup's ruling, but from its own 
failure to exercise its existing rights under law: After the Trustee's Sale, it was free to file 
a Proof of Claim with the Trustee for the deficiency; after the denial of discharge, it was 
afforded 30 days to file its Complaint under UCA §57-1-32. For all of these reasons, Judge 
Rigtrup's dismissal should be sustained. 
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Point IV: HARDY SHOULD BE AWARDED HIS ATTORNEYS FEES AND COSTS 
INCURRED IN DEFENDING THIS MATTER 
Hardy is entitled to be awarded his attorney's fees and costs in defending this action 
based both upon UCA §57-1-32 and based upon Citicorp's conduct of this case in both the 
District Court and in this Court. 
UCA §57-1-32 clearly provides that "the prevailing party shall be entitled to collect 
its costs and reasonable attorney fees incurred in bringing an action" under that section. 
This provision has been interpreted to extend to debtors prevailing in their defense against 
creditor's claims under that section. Occidental/Nebraska Federal Savings Bank v. Mehr, 791 
P.2d 217 (Utah Ct. App. 1990). 
Beyond the provision of UCA §57-1-32, Citicorp's actions in this matter justify award 
of attorney's fees. As discussed above, Citicorp did not make the District Court aware of 
UCA §78-12-41, the statute it was relying upon, nor did it make the District Court aware 
of U.S.C.A. § 108(c), the controlling statute in this matter. In its brief before this Court, it 
did not include the District Court's 12-18-89 Minute Entry and its response thereto, nor did 
it mention them, thus misleading this Court to believe that Citicorp had no opportunity to 
raise the limitations issue with the District Court. In its brief before this Court, Citicorp has 
not mentioned or even cited U.S.C.A. § 108(c), the controlling statute. Thus, Hardy, 
supposedly the responding party in this Appeal, has had to do all of the foundational 
research on the central issues to the Appeal. That burden is typically borne by the appellant 
and the Appellee responds in its brief. Citicorp has reversed the role and now has an 
opportunity, which Hardy does not have, to research and reply in writing to the substantive 
arguments. After doing Citicorp's work, Hardy contacted Citicorp and, citing the 
appropriate authorities in the matter, offered Citicorp an opportunity to withdraw its Appeal 
without incurring any obligation to pay Hardy's attorney's fees and costs. It declined to do 
Page 10 
so.6 As argued above, under the clear weight of law, Citicorp's Appeal, while perhaps not 
substantively frivolous, was without merit. However, procedurally, the manner in which the 
issues were raised in both the District Court and in this Court was frivolous, and its conduct 
justifies award of Hardy's attorney's fees and costs incurred herein. 
CONCLUSION 
Based upon the foregoing, Hardy urges this Court to affirm the District Court's 
dismissal of Citicorp's Complaint against Hardy and to enter its order awarding Hardy his 
attorney's fees and costs incurred in defending this matter and remanding the matter to the 
District Court for ascertaining and imposing those fees and costs. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this day of July, 1991. 
/S/ B. Clark-Arnold 
R. CLARK ARNOLD 
Attorney for Appellee/Defendant Hardy 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that on this July 26, 1991,1 properly served a true and correct copy 
of the foregoing Appellee's Brief on BRYAN ROBINSON and STEVEN D. BRANTLEY, 
Shapiro & Robinson, Attorneys for Appellant Citicorp Mortgage, Inc., 4516 South 700 East, 
Suite 360, Murray, Utah 84107, by depositing the same in the U.S. Mails, postage prepaid. 
/ s / R Clark-Arnold 
R. CLARK ARNOLD 
6By his signature to this brief, R. Clark Arnold certifies (i) that when the Stipulation for 
Enlargement and Partial Dismissal was signed, he suggested in a telephone conversation 
with Steven Brantley that, based upon the authorities cited herein, the appeal should be 
dismissed; (ii) that in a subsequent telephone conversation with Bryan Robinson, Mr. 
Brantley's senior partner, he made the same suggestion and discussed the alleged briefing 
deficiencies and furnished most of the citations contained in this brief; and, (hi), thereafter, 
Mr. Robinson,on behalf of Citicorp, specifically rejected the opportunity to withdraw this 
appeal, even though Mr. Arnold specifically told him that Mr. Hardy would waive any claims 
to attorney's fees and costs if the appeal were withdrawn prior to preparing this brief. 
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EXHIBIT A 
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Third Judicial District 
DEC 1 8 1989 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT dofep 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
S/CtfLAKS COUNTY A V V > 
Dapuiy Cleric 
CITICORP MORTGAGE, INC 
PLAINTIFF 
VS 
HARDY, WAYNE E 
TYPE OF HEARING: 
PRESENT: 
P. ATTY. 
D. ATTY. 
DEFENDANT 
MINUTE ENTRY 
CASE NUMBER 890904 015 PR 
DATE 12/18/89 
HONORABLE KENNETH RIGTRUP 
COURT REPORTER 
COURT CLERK CUG 
THIS CASE WAS ON THE COURTS' DISMISSAL CALENDAR DECEMBER 
14, 1989. A LAW CLERK DELIVERED A MOTION AND ORDER FOR ALTER-
NATIVE SERVICE & BASED THEREON THE CLERK CONTINUED THE MATTER TO 
THE COURTS DISMISSAL CALENDAR OF MARCH 16, 1990 AT 8:30 A.M. 
THE COURT HAS CONSIDERED THE MOTION FOR ALTERNATIVE SERVICE AND 
HAS REVIEWED THE FILE IN CONNECTION THEREWITH. THE COMPLAINT 
WAS FILED HEREIN ON JUNE 27, 1989. THE FILE DOES NOT CONTAIN 
AN "UNABLE TO LOCATE" RETURN WHICH WOULD INDICATE THAT A SUMMONS 
ISSUED WITHIN THREE MONTHS FROM THE DATE THE COMPLAINT WAS FILED 
AS REQUIRED BY RULE 4(B), U.R.C.P. THE COMPLAINT, AND ATTACH-
MENTS, SEEM TO INFER OR SUGGEST THAT A PRIVATE TRUSTEE'S SALE 
WAS CONDUCTED SEPTEMBER 28, 1988. THE DEFICIENCY ACTION HEREIN 
WAS FILED JUNE 27, 1989, MORE THAN THREE MONTHS BEYOND THE 
PRIVATE TRUSTEES' SALE ON SEPTEMBER 28, 1988, IN VIOLATION OF 
SECTION 57-1-32, U.C.A. IT APPEARS THE ACTION DOES NOT PROPERLY 
LIE. MOREOVER, THERE IS NO INDICATION WHY ALTERNATIVE SERVICE 
WOULD OR SHOULD CONFER IN PERSONAM JURISDICTION, PERMITTING THE 
COURT ULTIMATELY TO ENTER A PERSONAL DEFICIENCY JUDGMENT. FOR 
THE FOREGOING REASONS, THE COURT HAS FILED THE ORDER FOR 
ALTERNATIVE SERVICE UNSIGNED, AND WILL NOT APPROVE IT UNDER ALL 
OF THE FOREGOING CIRCUMSTANCES. IF THE "ALTERNATIVE SERVICE" IS 
NOT OTHERWISE JUSTIFIED WITHIN 15 DAYS, THE COURT WILL DISMISS 
THE ACTION FOR FAILURE TO PROSECUTE. 
CC: FILE / JUDGE / 
BRYAN C. ROBINSON - ATTORNEY 
180 SOUTH 300 WEST, SUITE 350 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84101 
EXHIBIT B 
Bryan C Robinson, Bar #2778 
Clay Harrison, Bar #5080 
SHAPIRO & ROBINSON 
Attorneys for Plaintiffs 
180 South 300 West, Suite 350 
Salt Lake City, UT 84101 
(801) 364-1818 
IN THE THIRD 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
CITICORP MORTGAGE, 
Plaintiff, 
v. 
WAYNE E. HARDY, 
Defendant. 
INC., ; i Plaintiff's Response 
i to Court's Minute Entry 
i of 12/18/89 
I Civil No. 890904015 PR 
i Judge Kenneth Rigtrup 
Plaintiff, by and through its attorney, Bryan C Robinson, 
responds to the Minute Entry of the Court dated 12/18/89, on the 
above referenced-matter. There appear to be three issues raised 
by the Court in this matter: 1) No "Unable to Locate Return" in 
file; 2) Timeliness of the filing of the action; and 3) In 
personam jurisdiction. Each of these issues will be dealt with 
in the order presented. 
1. No "Unable to Locate" Return. Admittedly, there is no 
return in the file. This is simply because Plaintiff has been 
unable to acquire these returns until today. The constable's 
office had simply forgotten to send the returns, and three 
requests were necessary before Plaintiff was able to procure 
them. A copy of the page of the summons stamped with time of 
^ T ^ w - ^ c 
V 
AL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR 
receipt by the Constable is attached as Exhibit "A" and is 
incorporated herein by reference. Please note that the date 
thereon (June 29, 1989) makes it clear that the summons was 
issued within the proper time. Find also attached a copy of two 
"Unable to Locate" returns made by the constable's office, which 
copies are attached hereto as Exhibits "B" and "C" and are 
incorporated herein by reference. 
2. Timeliness of the Filing of the Action. The Court is 
correct in noting that the Trustee's Sale was held on September 
28, 1988 and that this action was filed on June 27, 1989. 
However, there are other circumstances that need to be 
considered by the Court before dismissing the action as a 
violation of U.C.A. 57-1-32. Defendant had filed a Chapter 7 
bankruptcy in the United States Bankruptcy Court for the District 
of Utah on August 5, 1987. Due to the automatic stay imposed by 
3 62 of the Bankruptcy Code, Plaintiff was required to obtain a 
lift of stay in order to foreclose the Property. Lift of stay 
was obtained, pursuant to that Order lifting the automatic stay, 
a copy of which is attached hereto as Exhibit "D" and 
incorporated herein by reference. The foreclosure action was 
commenced and completed, all according to and pursuant to U.C.A. 
57-1-23, et seq., and as declared in that copy of the Trustee's 
Deed attached to Plaintiff's complaint. 
Plaintiff suffered a loss as a result of said foreclosure. 
The details and amounts are also stated in Plaintiff's complaint. 
On or about May 17, 1989, Plaintiff received a Notice of Denial 
of Discharge, as required by Rule 4006 of the Bankruptcy Rules. 
A copy of this Notice is attached hereto as Exhibit "E" and is 
incorporated herein by reference. Exhibit "F" attached hereto 
and incorporated herein by reference, is a copy of the 
Bankruptcy Court Minutes relating to this matter. These minutes 
state clearly that Defendant was guilty of making a false oath, 
and that the nature of this fraud was 7/substantial and 
egregious." According to 362(c)(2)(c), denial of discharge 
lifts the automatic stay. Lift of stay, together with denial of 
discharge allows a creditor to pursue its remedies at law. As 
Notice was received by Plaintiff on our about May 17, and since 
the automatic stay prevents the running of any statute 
limitation, Plaintiff's filing of this action was timely and 
should not be dismissed. 
3. In Personam Jurisdiction. Plaintiff hereby withdraws 
its motion to serve Defendant by alternative service. Plaintiff 
admits that it is necessary to make personal service upon 
Defendant in order to obtain a personal judgment. Plaintiff 
assures the Court, however, that several new leads have turned 
up, all of which will be helpful in locating the person of the 
defendant. Plaintiff also has reasonable belief that Defendant 
works in Salt Lake County, and there is good reason to believe 
that Defendant also resides in Salt Lake County. Plaintiff is 
given a statutory period of one year from date of filing to 
locate the defendant. The period allowed would not expire until 
September 8, 1990, and Plaintiff fully intends to use each day 
necessary to locate the defendant. 
Wherefore, Plaintiff prays that the Court refrain from 
dismissing this action. 
DATED this 29th day of December, 1989. 
ryan G'Robinson 
torney/for Plaintiff 
s2:®1381.res 
